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2. Korea - North China - Japan

As of 25 October, only 20,000 North Korean troops (elements of seven divisions and four security brigades) were believed opposing advancing UN forces. An additional 15,000 are north of the 38th parallel, but cut off behind UN lines. An estimated 10,000 remaining in South Korea, apparently not centrally organized or coordinated, have continued guerrilla-type operations.

Disappearance of the bulk of North Korean radio communications, despite the continued existence of limited air force, ground force, and police radio nets, attests to the disruption of the chain of command. Present location of Supreme Headquarters is unknown. A North Korean message of 16 October indicates that Musan (40 miles northwest of Chongjin), as well as Simuiju, present North Korean capital, may be an exit point for military and government remnants. Communications intelligence has as yet provided no indication of the location of any North Korean radio station in Manchuria.

 Soviet and Chinese public statements indicate a long period of guerrilla warfare. On 19 October North Korean Supreme Headquarters directed that personnel not withdrawn from a subordinate headquarters "go into concealment and go about their own business."

There has been no definitive evidence in communications intelligence of Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

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
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Chinese Communist messages sent during the period 10 September to 15 October refer to the military use of all freight cars at Shanghai. Since the messages concern the inability to make commercial shipments between Shanghai and North China and Manchuria, they may indicate a considerable northward military movement. A [] message of 21 October reports observation of twenty northbound troop trains between Shanghai and Tientsin during one week. Additional troops and supplies for Fourth Field Army units in Manchuria might be involved.

Soviet messages of late September to Harbin and Peiping, concerning the delayed pick-up of petroleum products both in tank cars and containers at transshipment points on the Soviet-Manchurian border, may indicate clogging of Chinese oil transport facilities. During the spring large quantities of aviation gasoline entered Manchuria from the USSR. Since this gasoline is not known to have been transported south, nor to have been used during the summer, it is believed still available for use in Manchuria.

Large Chinese Communist purchases of drugs and medicines abroad during past months could represent an attempt to satisfy huge normal requirements, but a sharp increase in the rate of acquisition since the start of the Korean war may indicate military stockpiling.

The annual major-scale maneuver of the Soviet 5th Fleet, conducted in the Vladivostok area between 6 and 13 September, appeared to differ from those of previous years in that tactics of an offensive rather than defensive nature were stressed.



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