

SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

"A" USSR. Moscow Comments on Malik's Proposal. In a short review of the year's war in Korea, a 26 June Pravda editorial, after reiterating old charges of US "intervention" and again predicting failure for the US "interventionists," claimed that the Soviet government has made "several proposals" for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Despite the "rejection" of these proposals "by the US-UK majority in the UN," the article stated that the Soviet people "are certain that possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the conflict do exist. Such a possibility was put forward by Malik in his broadcast on 23 June." The views expressed by Malik, the Soviet representative to the UN, were said to have been "warmly welcomed" and "ardently supported in democratic circles of all countries." A broadcast to North America, in commenting on President Truman's 25 June speech, said that although the President said "nothing in particular or new on the war in Korea, he had to accept however, Malik's proposal..." (U FBIS, 26 June 51).

"B" Soviet Military Personnel Reportedly Entering Korea. [redacted] Soviet troops stationed at Amtung began crossing the Yalu River into Korea about 12 June in "groups of one thousand" daily. These troops were said to be spreading out continuously to a line from Huichon to Kanggye to Manpojin. They were equipped with "one gun per one hundred men" and carried the guns in carts when moving. Washington Comment: It is possible that the source is referring to non-Caucasian Soviet troops. ([redacted] 25 June 51). COMMENT: There have been previous suggestions that Soviet anti-aircraft artillery units may have been disposed along the rail line from Sinuiju to Pyongyang. While no definite confirmation has been received as yet concerning the presence of any Soviet combat units within Korea, it is conceivable that the personnel referred to in this report are anti-aircraft personnel being disposed along the rail line which leads into Korea from Manpojin.



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"C" CURRENT COMMUNISM. Report on US Atrocities Will Be Issued as UN Security Council Document. Soviet Delegate Malik, in his capacity as Security Council President, has requested the UN Secretariat to issue as a Security Council Document a sixty page report on alleged US and South Korean atrocities in Korea. The report was prepared by a delegation of members from the Communist Womens International Democratic Federation (WIDF) which visited North Korea for the purpose of investigating "US atrocities." The UN Secretariat has taken the position that it will not look behind the request of a member that a document be reproduced, nor will it question its relevance to an agenda item. ([redacted] 21 June 51; [redacted] 22 June 51). COMMENT: The WIDF's report has already received considerable publicity from Radios Moscow, Peking and other Communist propaganda media. It also was a major agenda item at the WIDF's recent executive committee meeting in Sofia. The report demands the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, and an opportunity for the Korean people to decide their own destiny and settle their domestic affairs. The US is accused of wanton destruction of food supplies, indiscriminate bombing of villages, and use of "weapons banned by international conventions, i.e., incendiaries, petrol bombs, napalm bombs, time bombs..." It is noteworthy that, unlike Radios Peking and Pyongyang, the commission, does not accuse the US of bacteriological warfare.

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"A" KOREA. On the Status of Communist Military Forces in Korea POW Reports. The following impressions were received by UN interrogation teams from recently captured prisoners: (1) surrenders are due to the hopelessness of local military positions, plus lack of food for two or three days prior to capture, and there is evidence of serious strain on transport accounting for a deterioration in quality and quantity of rations; (2) the majority of Chinese Communist troops in Korea are ex-Chinese Nationalist troops who may be regarded as thoroughly Communist indoctrinated; (3) most of the prisoners regard Soviet aid as coming from an ally and have no feeling of being Soviet puppets; (4) no Soviet troops are reported in the theatre; (5) the best CC armies having been destroyed large replacements, including both fresh recruits and experienced troops are being utilized to continue the fight and the POWs believe that future replacements will come from South China as the drain from the North is affecting farm output. The report, in summarizing the above impressions, states that the CC have the capacity to continue to pour disciplined armies into Korea, but due to logistical difficulties, they cannot mount a dangerous offensive without a significant increase in Soviet aid. Further, a stalemate would work against CC interests by increasing North Korean resentment. ([redacted] 25 June 51). COMMENT: While there is other evidence to support the first four points, the reference

to the destruction of the "best CC armies" probably refers to some of the 4th Field Army units recently reported as withdrawn with losses of 1/2 to 2/3 of their strength. The implication, however, that the best armies of the entire CC Army have been destroyed in Korea is not substantiated inasmuch as up to 75% of the forces thus far committed are ex-Nationalist troops.

"C"

Acting South Korean Chief of Staff Appointed. Brigadier General Lee Jong-Chan, presently commanding the Infantry School and Materiel Mobilization Board, has been selected to become the Acting Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, Navy, and Air Force during the temporary absence of Lieutenant General Chung Il-Kwan. Lee, scheduled to assume his duties on 25 June as a Major General, is the choice of the Minister of Defense and has wide military experience. As a former major in the Japanese Army Lee outranked Chung and other currently ranking Generals of the ROK Army and this reason appears to be widely respected by his fellow officers. It is felt by the Chief, KMAG, that Lee's selection will be "fairly satisfactory." ([redacted] 9, 24 June 51).

"B"

Substantial Communist Defense Construction Noted on Northwest Flank.

[redacted] an accent on heavy defensive construction opposite the UN northwest flank. The bulk of the substantial defensive installations completed or under construction during the past two weeks have been located in the area between the mouth of the Imjin River and the southwest corner of the "Iron Triangle" in the vicinity of Chorusan and have included sizeable tank traps reinforced with road-blocks and mine fields as well as the usual infantry emplacements. The possible use of this line as a holding position in the next offensive is supported by the absence of significant vehicle movement, troop concentration or supply build-up in the rear of this sector. Furthermore, evidence of the concentration and regroupment of forces east and west of Kumhwa and the enemy's determined defense of his routes of access to the "triangle's" vital road net indicate the central sector as the target of the main effort when the enemy resumes the offensive. ([redacted] 26 June 51). COMMENT: The preparation of anti-tank barriers across the approaches to the Pyongyang area is incumbent upon the enemy with the approach of drier weather within the month which will favor the employment of superior UN mechanized forces.

"C"

Effectiveness of North Korean Army Reported Reduced. Information based purely on interrogations of recent prisoners indicates that the North Korean Army now consists of "manpower remnants," with its effectiveness greatly reduced below July 1950. The army now appears to be useful primarily for guerrilla-like operations, and its effectiveness probably will decline with further casualties. ([redacted] 25 June 51). COMMENT: It is not known whether the interrogations were sufficiently widespread to provide an accurate picture of the overall manpower situation - the report may reflect the situation in specific units of the North Korean Army. Other sources indicate that the North Korean Army is now as large as it was at the outbreak of hostilities.