

BW AND THE KOREAN WAR

After a further decline in the volume of comment on BW during the first week of the SURVEY period which brought the level of attention to the lowest point since the campaign began, the Soviet radio has at least temporarily halted a trend noted since the week of 17-23 March by increasing the number of such references.

The fact that this increase is largely a factor of the widespread distribution of two routine items, and that Peking and Pyongyang have not similarly increased their references to BW (although the development has been parallel in the past), suggests that the increase is accidental and does not foreshadow a general revival of the campaign. Also, such random deviations from an otherwise sustained trend have often characterized major propaganda campaigns in the past.

While Peking and Pyongyang continue to interject those thematic staples which characterized Korean war comment prior to the BW campaign, Moscow's new preoccupation with germ warfare has led to the virtual elimination of such themes after they had shown an increasing incidence during the first week.

Moscow maintains its customary attitude of aloofness concerning the truce negotiations, and thus has not reflected Peking's increasingly adamant tone. Pyongyang generally remains noncommittal.

BW References Increase After 5-Week Decline: Although the level of attention to bacteriological warfare decreased in five weeks from 23 to 5 percent of all Moscow's commentaries, during the week 20-27 April Soviet attention to BW increased to 7 percent. This reversal has also been reflected in news items broadcast to the Soviet people. However, the fact that almost half of Moscow's total commentary attention consists of two widely broadcast items would seem to mitigate the implications of the sudden rise. A NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY report on the findings of the Chinese Commission sent to investigate the BW charges in Korea is broadcast 32 times, and a Krainov commentary which reiterates previous lines and contains no new elements is broadcast 20 times. The increase in the number of items directed to domestic audiences is largely the result of voluminous protests against the dismissal of IADL Chairman Brandweiner from his Graz University post.

The new trend in Moscow's exploitation of the BW charges is characterized by a concentration of such comment in broadcasts directed to the United States and Western Europe, and is about evenly divided between proofs of U.S. guilt (broadcast mostly to North America) and indignant protests against the use of such weapons (broadcast to Western European audiences). The somewhat artificial nature of the increase is further indicated by the failure to increase the number of broadcasts to Asiatic or Satellite audiences. Only four items primarily concerned with BW are broadcast in Korean and only eight are concerned either with BW or the Korean war.

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Chinese References Level Off After Sustained Drop: Peking and Pyongyang's failure to parallel Moscow's greater concentration on BW themes serves further to suggest that the higher figure this last week is random and that the rise is not an augury of renewed impetus to the campaign. However, Peking's level of attention to BW themes remains fairly constant during the second week (20-27 April), after the first week had been characterized by a further decline which brought the volume to the lowest point of the campaign. During each of the two weeks considered in this survey, approximately 16 percent of all items broadcast in Peking's international services were devoted to BW. Chinese regional stations have relegated the charges to relative unimportance; only 1.5 percent of the total items intercepted discuss the issue, and local domestic problems of all sorts have superseded regional concern with BW.

The Korean War; Ridgway's Appointment; Kim's Birthday: Moscow's increased concern with BW has entailed a parallel increase in the number of references to the Korean war, which also reverses a previous trend to remove BW from the war context. Aside from such references, Moscow's allusions to Korea consist almost entirely of 13 broadcasts of a commentary assailing Ridgway as a butcher of defenseless Koreans, and of 16 broadcasts belatedly hailing Kim Il Sung on his birthday. Ridgway's appointment to head the NATO armies is considered an augury of the sad fate awaiting the people of Europe under his military stewardship. Ten of the 13 broadcasts are beamed to Europe but none to North America. Ridgway's record as a butcher is murdering defenseless Europeans during World War II was widely broadcast as an indication of the fate awaiting the Koreans when he replaced MacArthur in April 1951.

Moscow's first recognition of North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung's birthday, which came almost two weeks after the event, was only by indirection. It consists of 16 broadcasts of an article written for PRAVDA by North Korean Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Pak Hun Yong hailing Kim as a faithful disciple of Stalin. Although Pyongyang broadcasts devoted a major portion of their newscast periods on the birthday occasion to fervent praise of Kim, neither Moscow nor Peking had made more than passing reference to the occasion, although this was a decennial birthday which usually merits special acclaim.

Nor has Moscow or Peking mentioned Stalin's gift of 50,000 tons of flour to the Korean people since the announcement was originally made two weeks ago. Pyongyang conversely has been extremely effusive in its praise for Stalin's solicitude and has said repeatedly that the gift will ease the admittedly serious food problem.

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Moscow Does Not Reflect Peking's Hardened Tone on Truce Talks: Although Peking's comment on the negotiations at Panmunjom resumes the note of intransigence which has been absent for several months, Moscow maintains its customary reserve. It limits itself almost completely to a daily transmission of the official North Korean communique. Peking, conversely, reveals a new adamancy concerning the three points at issue and pointedly insists that no compromise is possible. There is continued insistence that the question of Soviet membership on the neutral inspection teams is a "big problem" which cannot be easily solved, and similar intransigence is shown concerning the construction of airfields and prisoner repatriation.

VIETNAMESE REFERENCES LEVEL UP AFTER SUSTAINED DROP: Peking and Pyongyang's failure to parallel Moscow's greater concentration on BW themes serves further to suggest that the higher figure this last week is random and that the rise is not an augury of renewed impetus to the campaign. However, Peking's level of attention to BW themes remains fairly constant during the second week (20-27 April), after the first week had been characterized by a further decline which brought the volume to the lowest point of the campaign. During each of the two weeks considered in this survey, approximately 16 percent of all items broadcast in Peking's international services were devoted to BW. Chinese regional stations have relegated the charges to relative unimportance; only 1.5 percent of the total items intercepted discuss the issue, and local domestic problems of all sorts have superseded regional concern with BW.

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